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Intelligent mobile devices have become the focus of the electronics industry in recent years. 
These devices, e.g., smartphones and internet connected handheld devices, enable quick and 
efficient access of users to both business and personal data, but also allow the same data to be 
easily accessed by an intruder if the device is lost or stolen. Existing mobile security solutions 
attempt to solve this problem by forcing a user to authenticate to a device before being granted 
access to any data. However, such checks are often easily bypassed or hacked due to their 
simplistic nature. In this work, we demonstrate Invisible Shield, a gesture-based authentication 
scheme for mobile devices that is far more resilient to attack than existing security solutions and 
requires neither additional nor visible effort from user perspective. In this work, we design 
methods that efficiently record and preprocess gesture data. Two classification problems, "one 
vs. many" and "one vs. all," are then mathematically formulated and examined using the gesture 
data collected from 20 individuals. Classification algorithms specialized for each case are 
developed, achieving a classification accuracy as high as 90.7% in the former case, and an equal 
error rate as low as 7.7% in the latter using real Android systems. Finally, the system resource 
requirements of different classification algorithms are compared. 
 
 
INVISIBLE SHIELD: GESTURE-BASED MOBILE AUTHENTICATION 
Kent W. Nixon, M.S. 
University of Pittsburgh, 2016
 
 v 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PREFACE .................................................................................................................................... IX 
1.0 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................ 1 
2.0 BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW ......................................................................... 3 
2.1 PROPOSED SOLUTION ................................................................................... 3 
2.2 CHALLENGES .................................................................................................... 5 
3.0 DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS ................................................................. 8 
3.1 DATA COLLECTION ........................................................................................ 8 
3.2 STANDARDIZATION ...................................................................................... 11 
3.3 NORMALIZATION .......................................................................................... 14 
4.0 AUTHENTICATION ALGORITHMS ................................................................... 16 
4.1 ONE VERSUS MANY (OVM) ......................................................................... 16 
4.2 ONE VERSUS ALL (OVA) .............................................................................. 19 
5.0 RESULTS ................................................................................................................... 21 
5.1 OVM ANALYSIS .............................................................................................. 21 
5.2 OVA ANALYSIS ............................................................................................... 26 
5.3 RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS ..................................................................... 28 
6.0 DISCUSSION ............................................................................................................. 32 
7.0 RELATED WORK .................................................................................................... 35 
 vi 
7.1 DEVICE INTERACTION ................................................................................ 35 
7.2 GESTURE AUTHENTICATION .................................................................... 36 
7.3 ALTERNATE DEFINITIONS ......................................................................... 36 
8.0 CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................... 37 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ....................................................................................................................... 38 
 vii 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table 1. Sample Feature Data ....................................................................................................... 10 
Table 2. Symbols definition and description ................................................................................ 15 
 viii 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure 1. Data flow of Invisible Shield system ............................................................................... 5 
Figure 2. Timing distribution for recorded gestures ....................................................................... 6 
Figure 3. User and recording app displaying fish pattern ............................................................... 9 
Figure 4. Invisible Shield sampled sensors ................................................................................... 10 
Figure 5. Accuracy results using kNN classifier ........................................................................... 23 
Figure 6. Impact of training set size and sample rate on classification accuracy ......................... 24 
Figure 7. Accuracy results using a multivariate Gaussian classifier ............................................ 25 
Figure 8. Equal error rates utilizing a multivariate Gaussian classifier ........................................ 27 
Figure 9. Power measurement setup. ............................................................................................ 28 
Figure 10. Recorded power levels for LG Nexus 4 device. .......................................................... 29 
Figure 11. Power consumption of Invisible Shield over a day of use. .......................................... 30 
 ix 
PREFACE 
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and thanks are as follows: My advisor, Dr. Yiran Chen, for first recruiting me into the 
Evolutionary Intelligence lab, and for his constant encouragement and presentation of exciting 
opportunities since. My professor and collaborator, Dr. Zhi-Hong Mao, for inspiring me to 
appreciate the beauty of mathematics and for lending his insight when mine inevitably fell short. 
Finally, my friend and lab-mate Xiang Chen, for providing invaluable (even if sometimes terse) 
feedback on my research methods and writing style. 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
Intelligent mobile devices have become the major horsepower behind the evolution of the 
modern electronics industry: smartphone and tablet shipments triple every six years, and are 
anticipated to reach a volume of 1.7B in 2017 [18]. Besides communication, smart mobile 
devices are broadly utilized in many aspects of everyday life, such as web surfing, entertainment 
viewing, fitness tracking, etc. With 84% of smartphone owners now utilizing their device to store 
both business and personal data [1], protection of this information has become a major concern. 
Although a number of solutions for mobile device security and authentication have been 
proposed, the most popular schemes like PIN and pattern lock remain easily bypassed [2][3]. 
Mobile phone manufacturers have begun to include biometric identification systems in 
their products to address this security weakness. As an example, a fingerprint scanner was 
introduced in both the Apple iPhone 5S and HTC One. However, such biometric authentication 
methods suffer from two intrinsic drawbacks: First, they often incur extra cost, e.g., bespoke 
sensors like fingerprint scanners. Second, the authentication procedures of these solutions still 
require extra time and effort before a user can access their data, no different from conventional 
methods. This delay continues to be the largest contributor to reduced user adoption rates of 
mobile security solutions in general [12]. 
In this work, we propose Invisible Shield, a gesture-based mobile authentication scheme 
which overcomes the drawbacks of existing security solutions. Our scheme is based on data 
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recorded during regular operation of the device using only existing, internal sensors. Specific 
contributions of our work to the field include: 
 
• Mathematical definition of two authentication scenarios, "one versus many" and "one 
versus all," and application of gesture-based classification algorithms for each case; 
• Demonstrating that normal device interaction contains sufficient information to be 
utilized as a highly reliable authentication key, achieving an identification accuracy as 
high as 90.7% and allowing for an entirely transparent security scheme for mobile 
devices; 
• Identification of the most efficient form of data representation, sample rate, and training 
set size so as to achieve maximized classification accuracy and minimized system 
resource requirements; 
• Detailed analysis of the utilized classification algorithms in terms of feasibility, accuracy, 
and demand on mobile device resources. 
 
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a background on 
gesture-based mobile security solutions and an overview of our Invisible Shield system; Section 
3 presents our data collection and processing techniques; Section 4 details the two target mobile 
security scenarios, and our developed approaches to each; Section 5 illustrates the experimental 
results; Section 6 provides discussion regarding our experimental results; Section 7 reviews 
related works; and Section 8 concludes the paper. 
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2.0  BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW 
Without loss of generality, we define "gesture" as the way in which a user interacts with their 
device. Because the majority of interaction with modern mobile devices involves interfacing 
with a touchscreen, we limit our examination to only gestures performed during these 
interactions.  
The human hand contains 29 pieces of bone, 35 pieces of muscle, 48 strips of nerves, and 
123 pieces of ligament [19]. Such biometric features cause an individual’s gesture to be entirely 
unique, with this uniqueness further emphasized by varying flexibility of joints and personal 
comfort preferences [6]. Hence, the unique nature of gesture defines it as an ideal vehicle for 
user identification. Further, gesture patterns are not only unique but also change over time [15], 
allowing authentication credentials to evolve with the user. 
2.1 PROPOSED SOLUTION 
Invisible Shield functions as follows: First, gesture information is captured as a user interacts 
with their device. The accelerometer, gyroscope, and touchscreen are polled for information 
while a user is in direct contact with the touchscreen. Once the user is no longer in contact with 
the touchscreen, the gesture is considered complete and all collected data is stored to a database. 
We note that the three selected sensors are utilized as they are almost universally available on 
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modern mobile devices, allowing Invisible Shield to theoretically function regardless of the 
specific device on which it is being used.  
The recorded data is standardized and normalized into a uniform format for later 
comparison. Specifically, standardization transforms gesture data into equally sized data vectors 
with constant sample rates. As different sensors on a device likely report raw data values with 
varying magnitudes, normalization is performed to remove this artificial weighting from the 
recorded features. The set of newly-formatted data then becomes the basis of a user profile 
utilized to uniquely identify an individual. 
As new input gestures are received, they are compared to existing user profiles utilizing 
machine-learning and pattern-matching techniques, which are selected based on the 
authentication scenario. Two distinct scenarios are defined: "one versus many" and "one versus 
all." "One versus many" (OVM) denotes the case that an unknown user is identified based on 
his/her gestures as one out of a finite group of known users. Alternatively, "one versus all" 
(OVA) denotes the case that an unknown user is identified either as the owner of a device or as 
an attacker.  
In either case, once an input gesture passes the authentication check, the user is allowed 
continued access to the device, and the newly recorded gesture is added to the database of 
gestures for that user. The oldest gesture is then removed from the same database and the user 
profile is updated, allowing the Invisible Shield system to evolve with the user. If the input does 
not pass an authentication check, it likely originates from an attacker, so the device is locked to 
protect the user’s data.  
An overview of Invisible Shield is shown in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. Data flow of Invisible Shield system 
 
 
2.2 CHALLENGES 
The first challenge in Invisible Shield system design is the identification of features which 
represent a user’s gesture quantitatively. Our design utilizes sensors already embedded on the 
device to record information related to gesture while a user interfaces with the device. In addition 
to being available on most mobile devices, the specific sensors we utilize are selected as they 
provide data closely associated with the way a user is currently interacting with the phone or 
tablet. Through the classification accuracy of our algorithms, we show that the data returned 
from these sensors sufficiently defines a user’s unique gesture. 
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The second challenge is to convert the raw data recorded from device sensors into a 
standardized format such that it can be used in machine-learning algorithms. In our data 
collection phase, gestures are recorded which occur over a period ranging from 0.3 to 2.2 
seconds in length, with a timing distribution as seen in Figure 2. The varying duration of the 
gestures, combined with the fluctuating rate at which the Android OS returns data from sensors, 
results in gestures containing differing amounts of raw data. In our work, we standardize and 
normalize gesture data before attempting to utilize it for classification. We consider two 
standardization and two normalization methods, and determine which yields the highest 
consistency for user identification while maintaining differentiability between users.  
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Figure 2. Timing distribution for recorded gestures 
 
 
The third challenge is to determine which algorithms function best to correctly classify 
users based on their gestures. As the targeted classification problem is partitioned into OVM and 
OVA, we are able to focus our examination on algorithms specifically suited to each situation. In 
Section 4, we discuss the various approaches we attempt. 
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Finally, the remaining challenge is to design an authentication system that will evolve 
with the user. It has been suggested in other works that user gestures change over time [15]. 
Utilizing the collected data, examine methods to account for this. Based on a rolling database of 
training data, we are able to effectively compensate for the shift of the gesture data over time. 
Besides the above theoretical challenges, feasibility requirements need also be fulfilled. 
In a real world scenario, training time required by Invisible Shield must be minimized to 
encourage users to adopt it. However, most pattern-recognition algorithms achieve higher 
classification accuracy with a larger training set. In order to find the most efficient solution to 
this tradeoff, accuracy is investigated utilizing a range of previous inputs as training data.  
Furthermore, the sampling resolution required to achieve optimal classification accuracy 
must be evaluated. Sampling from sensors at higher rates enhances observation granularity and 
will likely improve classification accuracy. However, this requires additional power and greater 
utilization of system resources during the recording stage as well as an increase in processing 
time in the classification stage. We analyze recorded gesture data at different sampling rates via 
down sampling from an original raw recording in order to evaluate the impact on classification 
accuracy. 
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3.0  DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS 
This section describes the data collection methods and sample group utilized as part of Invisible 
Shield. Also discussed is the mathematical description of gesture data referenced throughout the 
rest of the paper, as well as the various techniques used to standardize and normalize raw data. 
3.1 DATA COLLECTION 
To collect gesture data suitable for analysis with the Invisible Shield system, a gesture recording 
application is developed based on the Android lock screen. In it, a 3×3 grid of dots is displayed 
to the user, who is then tasked with connecting the correct dots in the correct order to form an 
unlock pattern. In our experiments, the unlock pattern is set as a "fish" shape – a gesture which 
utilizes the top six dots in the 3×3 grid, as displayed in Figure 3. This particular recording 
method and pattern are selected as they are easy for users to understand and perform. All 
subjects are asked to draw the same "fish" in order to guarantee that any differences between 
users will result from the way the gesture is performed and not the gesture itself. 
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Figure 3. User and recording app displaying fish pattern 
 
 
Our gesture recording application is deployed onto several LG Nexus 4 devices running 
the Android 4.3 operating system. The application samples and records data from the device 
touchscreen, accelerometer, and gyroscope while the user is in direct contact with the 
touchscreen. During each gesture, data is first sampled from sensors at the maximum possible 
rate allowed by the device. At each sample point a total of 11 values are recorded, a summary of 
which is shown in Figure 4, with sample values from the sensors displayed in Table I. 
 10 
• Time Stamp
• Touch x-Location
• Touch y-Location
• Touch Area
• Touch Pressure
Touch Screen
• x-Axis Acceleration
• y-Axis Acceleration
• z-Axis Acceleration
Accelerometer
• x-Axis Orientation
• y-Axis Orientation
• z-Axis Orientation
Gyroscope
 
  
  
  
  
   
   
 
                                    (a)                                                             (b) 
Figure 4. (a) A user gesture is composed of many discrete samples (b) Each sample contains F=11 raw 
features 
 
 
Table 1. Sample Feature Data 
Parameters Mean Variance 
Time Stamp 
Touch x-Location 
Touch y-Location 
Touch Area 
Touch Pressure 
x-Axis Acceleration 
y-Axis Acceleration 
z-Axis Acceleration 
x-Axis Orientation 
y-Axis Orientation 
z-Axis Orientation 
82.10 
631.00 
158.00 
0.29 
0.71 
2.52 
8.29 
5.48 
0.05 
-0.04 
0.13 
7.01 
22.80 
23.00 
0.03 
0.03 
1.01 
0.57 
0.68 
0.17 
0.17 
0.10 
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Gesture samples are collected from 20 subjects between the ages of 21 and 26, including 
7 female users and 13 male users. Each subject is given a device preloaded with the gesture 
recording application for a 1-2 week period. The gesture recording application reminds the 
subject to interact with the device once an hour by vibrating and displaying an onscreen 
notification. At that time, the user repeats the "fish" gesture on the device ~15 times, resulting in 
a total of between 178 and 2036 recorded gestures per user. By collecting samples gradually over 
a long period of time, variance induced by muscle exhaustion and boredom are minimized. In the 
case where a user enters the wrong pattern into the device, e.g. missing one of the dots or 
connecting them in the wrong order, the data from that gesture is not recorded in the gesture 
database. 
3.2 STANDARDIZATION 
The Android OS does not permit a constant data sampling rate from attached sensors. Instead, 
sensor data is supplied at a coarsely-grained, system relative rate, i.e. slow, medium, fast. The 
recording application requests data at the highest rate possible, resulting in an average (but not 
constant) sample rate of approximately 200Hz. The inconsistencies in sampling rate, in addition 
to varying gesture durations, cause each data vector to contain differing amounts of sample 
points. 
In order to reliably compare user gestures, all samples are reformatted to a uniform 
structure, or standardized. In cases where sample duration is variable, a common method of data 
standardization defines a maximum time window within which each time series is expected to 
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fit. This method is further extended to extrapolate sample points from the raw data which occur 
at regular intervals within the time window, approximating a constant sample rate. We refer to 
this process as "temporal" standardization.  
Mathematically, each recorded gesture is defined as originating from one out of N users. 
For user , data vector  represents a single gesture where  and  is the total 
number of gesture samples recorded for that user. Within vector  there are  subvectors 
denoted as , each representing a single sample point where . Each  contains 
 raw features, addressed individually as  with . The dimensionality of 
each  is then equal to . Table II contains a summary of these variables and definitions. 
Temporally standardized data vector  and its subvectors  are defined using 
.    (1) 
Here , where  is the total number of temporally equidistant samples in the 
standardized data vector.  is determined as 
,      (2) 
where  is duration of the standardized time window in seconds and  is the desired 
sample rate within the window. Each sample point  in the standardized data set is taken to 
occur at time , which is calculated by 
.           (3) 
Raw data samples  and  are the recorded samples that occur at time  and , 
immediately before and after time , respectively. For gestures that do not last the full 
duration  there may not exist  for every ; in such cases, . In our work, we 
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examine data standardized with  and , which allows a time window long 
enough to entirely contain almost every recorded gesture. 
While temporal standardization is the traditional method of handling data time series, 
very few of the recorded input gestures exist for the full duration . The result of this is that 
standardized data vectors contain a large number of trailing zeroes which likely contribute little 
to classification accuracy. This has a further effect of causing the machine-learning algorithms 
explored in Section 4 to utilize valuable system resources processing data that is insignificant. 
In response to this perceived inefficiency, we propose "spatial" standardization to process 
the data in our design. Spatially standardized data vector  and its sample points  are 
calculated using Eq. (1), but with  redefined as 
,       (4) 
where  is the number of temporally equidistant samples of gesture  that occur 
between  and . While every temporally standardized  shares the sample 
rate , each spatially standardized  has its own unique sample rate , defined based on  
.      (5) 
By having a unique sample rate for each gesture, it is guaranteed that each standardized 
data vector is fully utilized to store unique information from the original gesture, eliminating 
trailing zeroes. 
Classification accuracy when using both temporal and spatial standardization is 
investigated in Section 5. 
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3.3 NORMALIZATION 
Individual feature values reported by a device’s sensors have different magnitudes. In order to 
avoid individual features being artificially weighted by their size relative to other components, 
the magnitude of each feature score must be normalized. Table I contains measurement values 
taken from a random set of sample points recorded using an LG Nexus 4 smartphone as an 
example of the raw values which are returned from device sensors. Although a normalization 
method can be easily determined for this specific device, the goal of Invisible Shield is to 
function on all existing devices, regardless of specific hardware components or returned 
measurement values. Hence, a normalization technique that functions regardless of the actual 
values returned by sensors is developed. 
One possible normalization strategy is to adjust feature values such that each feature is 
restricted to the range 0-1 [20]. Each feature  of normalized vector  is calculated from 
standardized vector  using the  previous inputs from user  via 
.        (6) 
This method is referred to as "naïve" normalization, as it has the easily recognizable 
drawback that extreme outliers can have disproportionate effect on normalized feature scores. In 
order to compensate for this, a z-score normalization method [21] is also investigated as a 
potentially superior method, and the impact of both normalization methods on classification 
accuracy is examined in Section 5. 
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Table 2. Symbols definition and description 
Symbol Description 
 
Total number of users 
 
Total features per sample 
 
Raw gesture data from user  
 
The th gesture in data set  
 
The th sample point in gesture  
 
The th feature of sample point  
 
Total number of recorded gestures for user  
 
Total sample points in gesture  
 
Standardized gesture data from user  
 
Normalized gesture data from user  
 
Number samples in standardized data 
 
Number seconds input gesture may last 
 
Sample rate of standardized data 
 
Number of gesture partitions 
 
Time of th sample in  
 
Number of training gestures 
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4.0  AUTHENTICATION ALGORITHMS 
In this section, the authentication algorithms developed for the targeted applications "one versus 
many" (OVM) and "one versus all" (OVA) are described in detail. 
4.1 ONE VERSUS MANY (OVM) 
In the case of OVM, an algorithm must identify which user is interfacing with the device out of a 
set of known users. An example of such a situation would be a family tablet that is able to adjust 
its interface to suit the interests of the family member currently using it. Two types of 
classification algorithms, k-nearest neighbor and generative models, are examined and applied to 
this scenario. 
4.1.1 K-Nearest Neighbor 
k-Nearest Neighbor (kNN) algorithms are commonly utilized when attempting to classify input 
data based on one of N known classes [17]. A kNN classification algorithm is desirable in that it 
is accurate and computationally lightweight when the number of users and gestures are small. 
The algorithm functions by maintaining a database of  previous inputs for each user . 
When a new input  is received from user , it is compared to all previous inputs in the 
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database using a selected distance metric. Input  is then determined as originating from user  
 such that the majority of its k-nearest neighbors also originate from user . When , 
classification is considered correct. 
Classification accuracy is investigated for all , with the upper limit of  
being selected as it represents a realistic value for the number of gestures a user can be expected 
to perform in a single day [4]. The value of  remains constant at  for all classification 
attempts, as it has been shown that the specific value of  exerts little influence over 
classification accuracy [17]. Lastly, we select a Euclidian distance metric to compare gestures. 
4.1.2 Generative Model 
Generative models function by first creating a simplified mathematical representation of each 
user. Each representation is constructed by maximizing the probability that the model will 
generate the data already recorded from that user. When a new input is received, the probability 
of it being generated by each user’s model is determined. The input is then classified as 
belonging to the user whose model has the highest probability of generating it. 
In this work, we assume that all recorded features from a gesture exhibit Gaussian 
distributions, leading us to select a multivariate Gaussian generative model as our basis for each 
user. The parameters of this model include the class mean  and class covariance , which can 
be estimated using the sample mean and sample covariance of the  previous inputs (training 
data) from each user. The originator of input  is determined to be user  where the model for 
user  has the highest calculated probability of generating  using 
.    (7) 
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Of note is that the algorithm utilizes the logarithm of the probability density function 
(PDF) instead of the PDF itself. The reason for this is that in cases of high-dimensional data 
(high sample rate), the magnitude of calculated probabilities becomes too small to represent 
reliably using double-precision floating point values. By instead utilizing the logarithm of the 
PDF, generated probabilities exist entirely within a representable range. 
A multivariate Gaussian distribution model is potentially beneficial as it is able to weight 
features individually and detect relationships between features through the use of the sample 
covariance, . However, generative models place a heavy reliance on having access to an 
abundance of training data, as the additional information allows for the closer approximation of 
class models. In addition to this,  is required to be nonsingular for the PDF to be defined, in 
turn requiring  to be greater than the dimensionality of . At higher sampling rates, gesture 
data vectors contain over 1,000 features, which translate to more than 10 days’ worth of gestures 
from the average user. By our definitions, this requirement causes Invisible Shield to become 
unlikely feasible in terms of training time. 
To overcome this drawback, a dimensionality reduction algorithm is utilized to project 
recorded data vectors onto a  dimensional subspace. Each user’s generative model is then 
constructed within this subspace, whose reduced dimensionality greatly increases the likelihood 
that  will be full rank even for small values of . Principal component analysis (PCA) [16] is 
utilized as it creates a low-dimensional subspace for data while maintaining as much of the 
original sources of variance as possible. 
While this allows the generative model to function feasibly, there remains a reliance on 
large values of , as PCA introduces a loss of characteristic variance during dimensionality 
reduction, even though it is minimized. 
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4.2 ONE VERSUS ALL (OVA) 
In the case of OVM authentication, an unknown user is given a binary classification as either the 
one known owner of a device or an attacker. Because previous input gestures are only available 
from the device owner, threshold-based classification can be utilized to determine the originator 
of any inputs. The accuracy of generative models is evaluated when applied to the OVA 
problem. 
4.2.1 Gaussian Generative Models 
The techniques utilized in Section 4.1.2 can be easily modified to work in a one versus all case. 
However, instead of having a separate model for each user in a group of users, only the model 
for the actual owner of the device is maintained. When a new input gesture is recorded, the 
probability of it being generated by the user is calculated and compared to a preselected 
threshold value. If the probability is greater than the threshold value, the originator of the gesture 
is assumed to be the user and they are allowed continued access to the device. If the probability 
is below the threshold, the user is assumed to be an attacker and they are denied access to the 
device. 
Varying the threshold has a direct effect on classification accuracy for the algorithm. 
Decreasing the threshold reduces the number of attackers who are incorrectly given access to the 
device, which is termed the false positive rate (FPR). By forcing all input gestures to be closer to 
the user ideal before granting access to the device, FPR is reduced. However, gestures produced 
by the actual owner of the device are not perfectly ideal. This means that in some cases, the user 
may be incorrectly denied access to their own device – the proportion of the time this occurs is 
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referred to as the false negative rate (FNR). FNR can be reduced by increasing the classification 
threshold, but this in turn increases FPR. In order to simplify accuracy analysis, we consider 
equal error rate (EER) as the measure of classification accuracy. EER is the value of the FPR and 
FNR when the threshold has been tuned such that they are equal. 
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5.0  RESULTS 
In this section, the methods of estimating classification accuracy of Invisible Shield are described 
in detail. Also examined are the experimental results obtained using the classification algorithms 
detailed in Section 4. 
5.1 OVM ANALYSIS 
To demonstrate classification accuracy in the OVM scenario, the final 70 gestures recorded from 
each of the 20 subjects (1400 gestures in total) are classified. By using the final gestures 
recorded by each user, large variances from users altering their interactive preferences, i.e. 
orientation or method of gripping the device, were eliminated. By the time users recorded their 
last gestures, they were likely comfortable using the recording device and were no longer 
radically altering the way they interfaced with it. 
We consider training sets of  gestures, requiring a total of the last 170 
unique gestures from each individual. This is determined by the classification of the 70th-to-last 
gesture recorded from a subject, which requires at most the 100 gestures occurring before it as 
training data. 
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Although many subjects recorded significantly more than 170 gestures, three users 
recorded less than 200. In the context of this work, it was deemed more valuable to have sample 
sets from a larger group of user than it was to have larger sample sets from a smaller group of 
users. As such, the limit of 170 gestures per user was determined in order to be able to equally 
represent each user in the classification stage, as well as allow at least a 30 gesture buffer during 
which all users were becoming comfortable with the device. Extra sample data from other 
subjects is discarded as the additional gestures would result in uneven representation in testing 
data, influencing classification accuracy. 
When attempting to classify a gesture , training data is considered the final  recorded 
gestures for users . However, for user , training data is instead the  gestures that 
occur immediately before the current gesture. This approximates our defined use case where the 
gesture profiles for all other users of a device are already known and static, while the current 
user’s gesture profile is continuing to evolve as they interact with the phone or tablet. 
The accuracy results from the kNN classification scheme can be seen in Figure 5. The 3-
dimensional surface maps illustrate the classification accuracy for each combination of 
 and . The top row of results is generated using spatially 
standardized data, and the bottom row from temporally standardized data. Each column in the 
figure represents a different method of data normalization, with the first column containing 
results from non-normalized data, the second from naïve normalized data, and the third from z-
score normalized data. 
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Figure 5. Accuracy results using kNN classifier. From left to right: no normalization, naïve normalization, 
and z-score normalization. Top row is spatially standardized, bottom row is temporally standardized. 
 
 
The accuracy results indicate that spatially standardized user gestures allow for kNN 
classification algorithms to achieve higher classification accuracy than with temporally 
standardized data when utilizing the same number of the sample points. Further, naïvely 
normalizing feature data before attempting to classify gestures yields higher identification 
accuracy than that achieved using z-score normalized data sets.  
Figure 6 illustrates the influence of sample rate over the average classification accuracy 
for the kNN algorithm. It can be seen from the figure that increasing sample rate beyond 10Hz 
does not increase classification accuracy. In the normalized cases, average classification 
accuracy ceases to increase after reaching a sample rate of just 4Hz. This would indicate that the 
characteristic features embedded in user gestures likely occur in the 2Hz range, and is consistent 
with the findings in [22]. This is significant as capturing this data is possible even at extremely 
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low sample rates, meaning Invisible Shield can function optimally with a kNN classification 
algorithm while imposing very little load on mobile device resources. 
 
Figure 6. Impact of training set size and sample rate on classification accuracy. 
 
 
The kNN algorithm achieves a peak classification accuracy of 90.7% with spatially 
standardized data, naïve normalization, , and . 
For Gaussian generative models, the process for selecting training and testing data is 
identical to that of the kNN algorithm. The classification accuracy of the multivariate Gaussian 
generative model is included in Figure 7. The surface maps in the figure are positioned 
identically to that of the kNN results in Figure 5, with each combination of standardization, 
normalization, training set size, and sampling rate being represented. 
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Figure 7. Accuracy results using a multivariate Gaussian classifier. The top row is spatially standardized, the bottom 
row is temporally standardized. From left to right: no normalization, naïve normalization, and z-score normalization. 
 
 
The results are to be expected after reviewing the classification accuracy of the kNN 
algorithm. Spatially standardized data is again favored, and naïve normalized data gives the 
highest accuracy results on average. Figure 6 illustrates the impact of training set size and sample 
rate on average classification accuracy. The data indicates that a training set of  gestures 
is the best on average. Unlike kNN, generative model accuracy continues to rise as sample 
frequency increases.  
Of note, however, is that for every combination of standardization and normalization 
strategies, there exists an extreme peak in classification accuracy which occurs at a sample rate 
of approximately 4Hz. This is reflected in the results, with the generative model’s maximum 
classification accuracy of 89% occurring with  and  when applying spatial 
standardization and naïve normalization. The peak is followed by a rapid decline in classification 
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accuracy as the sample rate is increased beyond 4Hz, only returning to a comparable level after 
the sample rate has increased much further. 
While this "early peak" phenomenon is present in when utilizing a kNN algorithm, it is 
much more obvious here. This is likely brought about through the use of PCA, which indicates 
that there exists a large portion of the internal variance for a user which occurs at a frequency 
just above 2Hz. Unlike the unique, characteristic data that was previously identified as occurring 
near 2Hz, these higher frequency variations are almost identical for every user, causing a 
significant drop in classification accuracy once sample rate in increased to the point where they 
are detected and utilized. The results indicate that this identical information only occurs within a 
small frequency band, as when higher frequency variances are captured with faster sampling 
rates the classification accuracy slowly returns to its previous level. 
5.2 OVA ANALYSIS 
The accuracy of our OVA classification algorithm is evaluated by again performing 
classification for each of the  subjects utilizing the final 70 gestures from each to provide . 
We refer to  as the target gesture. 
A multivariate Gaussian generative model is created for the user based on the  gestures 
that were recorded immediately prior to the target gesture. From this model, the logarithm of the 
probability of the user generating  is calculated. Also calculated is the probability of 
generating the 10 first input gestures from users , which we refer to as imposter gestures. 
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The first 10 gestures from users  are utilized as imposter gestures as when they 
were created, subjects were likely not yet familiar with using the gesture recording device. 
Similarly, an attacker who has just taken a user’s phone or tablet would not be immediately 
comfortable using it, causing initial imposter gesture patterns to be highly variant in nature. By 
using the first gestures created by each user, we are able to closely approximate the real-world 
scenario of an attacker who has just taken the device. 
Figure 8 displays the EER results when using the multivariate Gaussian generative model 
in OVA authentication. Surprisingly, in this case, EER is lowest when no data normalization is 
performed, while our spatial standardization technique continues to yield the best results. 
 
Figure 8. Equal error rates utilizing a multivariate Gaussian classifier. The top row is spatially standardized, the 
bottom row is temporally standardized. From left to right: no normalization, naïve normalization, and z-score 
normalization. 
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5.3 RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS 
 
Figure 9. Power measurement setup. 
 
 
Runtime and power benchmarking is performed on the LG Nexus 4 devices while running the 
algorithms utilized in Invisible Shield in order to determine real world resource utilization. 
Figure 9 shows our benchmarking setup. In order to be certain that all power utilized by the 
device is being recorded, we remove the back cover and battery from the phone and modify the 
internal connector to draw power directly from a Monsoon Power Monitor. Figure 10 contains 
sample points collected using this test bench which show the power consumption of the device 
while performing the different calculations required by Invisible Shield. In the figure, the blue 
sample points are taken from the device while idling with the screen turned on displaying our 
gesture recording app. These measurements serve as a baseline by which to determine the 
additional power that is required by Invisible Shield. The green sample points are recorded while 
the additional sensors required by Invisible Shield (the accelerometer and gyroscope) are enabled 
and reporting at the highest sample rate, similar to the case when a user is interacting with the 
 29 
device. Finally, the red sample points are recorded while the additional sensors are enabled and 
the device is performing calculations as part of our machine-learning algorithms, e.g. matrix 
multiplication, PCA, etc. The trend lines in the figure detail the average power consumption in 
each case, and highlight the extra power overhead required by Invisible Shield in each of its 
functional stages. 
 
Figure 10. Recorded power levels for LG Nexus 4 device. 
 
 
Additionally, runtime benchmarking is performed using additional LG Nexus 4 phones. 
Android OS system timestamps and a benchmarking application are utilized to determine total 
processing time required to perform user authentication utilizing the two main machine-learning 
algorithms considered as part of Invisible Shield. Runtime benchmarking is performed for each 
combination of  and , and is combined with the results from power benchmarking to 
determine impact on device battery life and usability. 
 30 
Utilizing the parameters which achieve the highest classification accuracy with the kNN 
algorithm, a runtime of 46ms is required to determine which user a newly-recorded input gesture 
originates from. Device usability is not heavily impacted by this required processing time, even 
if performed after every input gesture. Further, modern mobile devices have multiple processor 
cores which would allow the task to be offloaded onto another core in the background while to 
user continues to utilize the device. Because of this capability, the main concern in modern 
systems instead becomes that of power consumption. In the case of the Nexus 4, assuming a user 
performs 1000 gestures on their phone everyday (100 unlocks followed by nine further gestures 
each time), Invisible Shield requires only 0.4% of the total battery power per day when utilizing a 
kNN classification algorithm. 
 
Figure 11. Power consumption of Invisible Shield over a day of use. 
 
 
With Gaussian generative models, the processing time is significantly longer at 181ms to 
achieve best case classification accuracy, which would likely be noticed by the user and would 
utilize 1.6% of the device’s battery life per day. However, this figure assumes that a new user 
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model is generated after every new gesture, requiring PCA to be performed each time. When the 
classification and model generation stages are decomposed, it is found that just performing PCA 
requires 128ms of computation, while classification only requires 53ms, which itself is on the 
same order as the kNN classification algorithm. The results in Figure 11 show that the system 
power requirements for this scheme become unmanageable as sampling rate increases beyond 25 
times per gesture. We note that this result assumes that a new user model is generated after every 
new gesture, requiring PCA to be performed each time. When the classification and model 
generation stages are decomposed, we found that just performing PCA requires 128ms of 
computation, while classification only requires 53ms. Hence, by reducing the frequency of 
model generation, power requirements could be reduced even further. 
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6.0  DISCUSSION 
Contrary to our initial hypothesis, our results showed that naïve normalization yields the most 
accurate results. This indicates that although outliers do play a role in gesture classification, it is 
a positive one. Happily, naïve normalization has the added benefit of requiring fewer 
calculations than z-score normalization, although the difference in real-world scenarios is likely 
negligible. 
In all cases, our spatial standardization scheme yielded better results than traditional 
temporal standardization, given than both contained the same number of sample points. 
However, note that spatially standardized sample points each contain an additional feature than 
those in temporally standardized data. This is because unlike in temporally standardized data, 
each sample point must store timing information as sample rate is not constant between gestures. 
This causes each temporally standardized  to be of dimensionality , while each 
spatially standardized  is of dimensionality . The result is that spatially standardized 
gestures require 10% more memory to store than temporally standardized gestures, and 21% 
more calculations during matrix operations. However, accuracy results can be realized which are 
similar to those achieved using temporally standardized data while using approximately half of 
the sample points, greatly reducing the required computations overall. 
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When using both kNN and generative models for OVA classification, it is noted that a 
peak in classification accuracy occurs when a sampling rate of 4Hz is utilized, itself allowing for 
the monitoring of 2Hz signals. The peak quickly drops off as the sampling rate increases to 
include sources of variance at higher frequencies. This finding is significant as it would suggest 
that classification accuracy can be greatly improved if gesture data were to be subjected to a low-
pass or band-stop filter before being analyzed with Invisible Shield. This would allow for the 
removal of higher frequency sources of variance that all users share. 
While kNN classification performs extremely well for such a lightweight algorithm, 
classification accuracy was likely limited due to the inability to weight feature values. By 
adopting a distance metric which is able to weight feature values, classification accuracy would 
likely be greatly improved. We pursued this possibility through the use of a large margin nearest 
neighbor (LMNN) algorithm, and were able to achieve classification accuracy as high as a 98.5% 
when utilizing the same dataset examined in this work. However, the computational complexity 
of generating parameters used by LMNN was such that it quickly became obvious that it was 
infeasible to implement on mobile devices. Hence, it is not formally examined here. 
Finally, in the case of both main algorithms it was shown that the required computation 
time and draw on system resources is negligible when classifying new inputs, meaning Invisible 
Shield can feasibly run in the background on a modern device. However, for multivariate 
Gaussian generative models, it was discovered that it was not realistic to regenerate a user model 
after every new input due to the computational complexity of performing PCA. This can be 
negated through the use of a more computationally efficient dimensionality reduction algorithm. 
However, the problem opens for consideration the question of how often a user model should be 
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recalculated in order to maintain classification accuracy. In this work, we assume after every 
gesture. However, as user gestures change slowly over time, this may not be the case. 
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7.0  RELATED WORK 
This section summarizes the previous works of others in this area or the topics related to 
it, and how our work can be differentiated from them. 
7.1 DEVICE INTERACTION 
Previous research has shown a strong link between hand biometrics and mobile device 
usage, with thumb link length and an individual’s degree of joint motion being the two largest 
contributors to input variation [8]. Similar studies have found that the size and shape of a mobile 
device also exerts a large influence over the way a user interacts with it, indicating that the same 
user would create different input patterns between two different devices [5]. These observations 
are leveraged in [13] where Cai et al. are able to identify the characters being selected on a 
mobile device’s on screen keyboard by utilizing only the information recorded from the device’s 
camera and accelerometer. In their research, it was found that some features, e.g., the striking 
and supporting force placed on the touchscreen, were highly variant between users, and as such 
needed to be filtered and ignored in their analysis. While not beneficial to Cai et al., features 
such as these that allow gesture to function as a form of identification. 
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7.2 GESTURE AUTHENTICATION 
In a recent study on gesture-based mobile authentication, Feng et al. utilized data 
recorded from a smartphone’s embedded sensors and those of a custom-made sensor glove in 
order to uniquely identify a user [14]. A false positive rate (FPR) of 2.15% and a false negative 
rate (FNR) of 1.63% were achieved through the use of decision tree, random forest, and Bayes 
Net classifiers. Although the results are encouraging, requiring the use of such a specialized 
piece of equipment when interacting with a smartphone is not entirely feasible outside of a 
laboratory environment, largely due to the added cost and inconvenience placed on an end user 
by such a device. 
7.3 ALTERNATE DEFINITIONS 
Conventionally, "gesture" has been used to describe a user making a unique, dedicated 
motion using their entire arm, wrist, and hand while holding a device [7][9][11][15]. In the 
significant body of research that identifies gestures as such, a low FPR and FNR were achieved 
when using them as a form of authentication by utilizing a very efficient dynamic time warping 
(DTW) algorithm to assist with classification [7][9][11][15]. Although fundamentally different 
in nature, the success of the DTW algorithm when applied to these conventional gestures likely 
translates well into our modern definition, as both utilize similar information collected from 
device sensors. However, up to this point, our work has focused on the use of the previously 
described algorithms over these. 
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8.0  CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we proposed a gesture-based mobile authentication scheme referred to as Invisible 
Shield. We defined two distinct authentication scenarios, "one versus many" and "one versus 
all," which allowed for the definition of classification algorithms specifically suited to each. 
In the case of OVM, two classification algorithms were investigated, i.e., a k-nearest 
neighbor and a generative model system based on Gaussian distributions. High classification 
accuracy was achieved in each system, 90.7% and 89%, respectively. Further, the results for 
each case revealed that gesture data formatted using a spatial standardization method and naively 
normalized yielded the highest classification accuracy. In addition to this, it was shown that high 
classification accuracy can be achieved when using a sample rate as low as 4Hz, as the results 
indicate there is a significant amount of user unique gesture information that occurs in the region 
of approximately 2Hz. 
As part of OVA analysis, a generative model system based on Gaussian distributions is 
examined and applied, yielding an EER as low as 7.7%. Results here mirror those found in 
OVM, with spatially standardized data yielding more accurate results. 
Finally, system resource utilization by the above algorithms is examined. It is discovered 
that a kNN algorithm only requires 0.4% of a user's battery life per day, making it an ideal choice 
for continuous, background authentication. 
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